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Abstract 
 Louisiana developed an extensive system of levees throughout the Atchafalaya Basin and 
along its territorial Mississippi River. This system reached its zenith on the eve of the American 
Civil War. It went into dramatic decline following the conflict due to the confluence of military 
activity, protracted irregular warfare, and neglect stemming from labor and capital revolution. 
These shifts intensified with the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation and finally consolidated after 
the ratification of Louisiana’s Constitution of 1879. The shift of responsibility for the 
construction and maintenance of levees during the Reconstruction Era led to many significant 
changes in the character and function of many of the State’s institutions as it struggled to adapt 
to the postwar order it confronted.  
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Introduction 
The State of Louisiana commands great power it due to its position on the delta of North 
America's Mississippi River, but this critical maritime feature relies upon a complex ecological 
system, one that has in turn influenced the course and formation of the state's administrative 
institutions at some decisive historical moments.  
Louisiana's rich alluvial soils and unending flows of water from the upper Missouri-
Mississippi-Ohio river network present significant advantages for agriculture. However, along 
with this opportunity, the low-lying, muddy character of the Lower Mississippi Valley 
necessitates heavy, sustained capital investment levee construction and maintenance if these 
hydrodynamic forces such as water levels and crevasses are to be contained and managed. These 
hydrological conditions proved within the tolerances of the Antebellum South's plantation 
economy. Masses of forced labor, harnessed by race and law into a system of generational 
slavery toiled with hydrophilic crops such as cotton and sugarcane. Farming assets essential to 
these endeavors further deepened non-state reserves of capital with implications for finance and 
banking. Both helped produce a patchwork of relatively successful flood and river control 
regimes leading to only intermittent flooding and steadily increasing yields.  
These advantages ended with Louisiana's participation in the American Civil War, a 
conflict that would see the end of slavery in the United States and the transfer of responsibility 
for water control from private to public burden. After the war, Louisiana's successive 
administrations would struggle to adapt the state’s institutions and methods to a new, daunting 
challenge of environmental engineering. However, in their practice these pre-national designs 
would fundamentally alter the structure and character of the state itself. 
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Figure 1. The location of the Atchafalaya Basin and lower Mississippi River in Louisiana.1 
                                                 
1 Malcom L. Comeaux, Atchafalaya Swamp Life: Settlement and Folk Occupations (Baton Rouge: School 
of Geoscience, 1972), 2. 
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This paper will first chart the course of development of plantation-centric water control 
practices within the Atchafalaya Basin region and the parallel course of the Mississippi River 
from 1803 to 1858, the years marking the start of efforts to clear the raft2 at the mouth of the 
Atchafalaya River and the final clearing of the Great Red River Raft in Central Louisiana. Next, 
it will provide an overview of the breakdown of management practices during the federal 
invasion of Louisiana in the American Civil War and subsequent damage and neglect of the 
levees, beginning with the First Bayou Teche Campaign and ending with the federal 
abandonment of levee repair efforts in 1868.3 The third section presents the crucial argument, 
where the state's efforts to meet these challenges contrast with the Antebellum situation. The last 
argues that the state itself was fundamentally changed through its interaction with a dynamic, 
living system, and that this shift constitutes some inherent agency on both the State’s and the 
environment’s parts.  
This paper will thus argue that the state's assumption of these new responsibilities in 
south-central Louisiana, particularly in the Atchafalaya Basin and along the Mississippi River 
south of its confluence with the Atchafalaya River, compelled policymakers to innovate 
politically and practically. In doing so, the state's administration altered existing institutions as 
well and began the creation of new and revolutionary initiatives.4 Plantations lined many of 
Louisiana’s Antebellum waterways, the seat of power of the planter class, an imposing 
constituency in the state’s legal calculus. The plantation itself was more than a factory or a 
                                                 
2 Martin Reuss, Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin 1800-1995 (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 26. “Rafts” refer  to the buildup of logs and organic material that can 
block the mouths of rivers. In Louisiana, these features were particularly significant in the Atchafalaya and Red 
Rivers. The Atchafalaya raft in particular reached a length spanning dozens of miles after centuries of compacting 
debris before being cleared. 
3 Walter McGhee Lowring, “The Political Career of James Madison Wells” (master’s thesis, Louisiana 
State University, 1946), 995-1092. 
4 Reuss. Designing the Bayous, 355. “State and federal engineers also resorted to craft and imagination in 
lieu of other empirical knowledge and scientific theory.” 
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building; it constituted a powerful force in the social and economic ordering of the prewar 
South.5 In Louisiana, the issue of levee maintenance extended this relationship to a triangular 
association, as the maintenance of the built environment depended upon prevention of an 
existential threat reaching across these other divisions. After the war, the inversion of planter and 
state responsibilities caused reverberations resonating into various Louisiana institutions. The 
state’s early prisoner leasing initiative, begun in the 1840s and whereby the private sector could 
extract basic labor from prisoners housed in the state penitentiary in Baton Rouge, suddenly 
transformed from a cost-saving measure to a stand-in for slavery as the administration leased the 
entire incarcerated population to private entrepreneurs.6 Prison gangs transported across parishes 
and into the swamp to labor on levee projects represents only one example of state entities 
altered by the changed circumstances in this period. These circumstances framed the challenges 
of development within an alluvial water management regime. 
This paper addresses another functional shift, a change in discourse. By this, I refer to the 
rhetoric and verbal culture of institutions, a metric which will allow for an examination of how 
people’s attitudes and thoughts shifted along with changing circumstances. Speeches, inaugural 
addresses, and public statements represent avenues measuring how state thinking changed during 
this period. These shifts are useful to the broader argument presented here. After the war, 
Reconstruction in Louisiana culminated in the views reflected in the reactionary Constitution of 
1879. The preceding Constitutional Convention of 1878’s rhetoric, like the atmosphere 
surrounding the debates more generally, reflects the human element of the state through the 
social and personal views of the interests of those powerful in society. This paper will argue that 
                                                 
5 John B. Rehder, Delta Sugar: Louisiana’s Vanishing Plantation Landscape (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 5. 
6William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1963), 129-130.  
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provisions found in this document reflect the legal depth of change effected on the state and its 
supporters. These constituencies acted in this way because of their interaction with the pressing 
dilemma of levee reconstruction and water control during the postwar period. 
The story of Louisiana’s relationship with its environment is tantamount to a history of 
the state itself. In the twenty-first century, coastal erosion and sea level changes cause existential 
threats to the population inhabiting many low-lying areas in its south. The legacy of efforts to 
effect centralized control across an unpredictable ecological system of such complexity merits 
unification into a greater narrative of the relationship of humans and the environment because it 
helps to frame the current situation facing this region. An environmental history approach to the 
case of the Pelican State during the middle of the nineteenth century will help to form methods 
for approaching other managed environments elsewhere in the Reconstruction Era South and 
provide a new way of understanding the State’s history during this period. 
The environmental challenges faced by residents of much of Louisiana cannot be equated 
with other states such as those of Virginia or Texas. A complete picture of Reconstruction cannot 
be painted until historians begin to place this period in its proper ecological and hydraulic 
context. 
Historiography 
Reconstruction in Louisiana 
 The foundations of historical inquiry into this period in Louisiana’s history usually lies 
upon the work of Charles Gayarré, whose History of Louisiana reflected his Antebellum, 
patrician worldview.7 The image of happily enslaved Africans and productive plantations that he 
                                                 
7 Frank J. Wetta, The Louisiana Scalawags: Politics, Race and Terrorism During the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2012), 5-8. 
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presents ends with the destruction experienced by Louisiana during the American Civil War. His 
rhetoric generally reflected the passionate emotions of the defeated. It is Gayarré who first 
inserted into the literature the notion of the constellation of carpetbaggers, freedmen, and 
scalawags.8 This casual outrage resurfaced in Alcée Fortier’s Louisiana,9 a three-volume index to 
the state’s history. In his section on Reconstruction, Fortier invoked sentiments about the 
freedmen as lacking in intelligence or independence, Reconstruction itself as a “farce,” and 
attributes the blame for a violent and anarchic period squarely on Republicans and northern 
interlopers. These two works bookend a period of popular Southern sentiment before any modern 
reappraisals of this period. 
 The academic foundation for the second period, a reappraisal taking up the “Lost Cause” 
argument, began with the publication in 1910 of Ficklen’s History of Reconstruction.10 
Posthumously edited and published, Ficklen (a Virginian and professor of history at Tulane 
University) saw his work on Reconstruction as appropriate for two reasons. First, as a non-native 
Louisianan he claimed a special objectivity, and second, that enough time had elapsed for 
passions to have died down. The anger reflected in the aftermath of the war by Gayarré and into 
the early 20th century by Fortier’s works are evidence of this prevailing sentiment. Ficklen 
posited that Louisiana and the South generally won the conflict emerging from the war. He 
reasoned that Reconstruction should be regarded as a failure, and therefore the return of white 
supremacy following the end of federal management capped a final triumph over northern 
designs. His account ends in 1868, but Lonn’s Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 sought to 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 2-3. 
9 Alcée Fortier, Louisiana: Comprising Sketches of Parishes, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons, 
Arrayed in Cyclopedic Form, Volume II (Madison, WI: Century Historical Association, 1914), 351-357. 
10 John Rose Ficklen, History of Reconstruction in Louisiana (Through 1868) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1910). 
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complete his work. 11 Her work was influenced heavily by Ficklen, drawing upon his book for 
the setting of the Reconstruction period. She portrayed the freedmen as tools of the Republican 
government, advanced notions of widespread corruption by northerners and sought to place the 
blame for difficulties in the state upon a “loyal element” supporting Lincoln’s designs upon the 
South. She furthered the notion that the South somehow “won” the conflict, and there are 
overtones of the “Lost Cause” narrative prevalent in the country at this time. Together, Ficklen 
and Lonn’s works should be seen together as constituting the first complete body of historical 
literature framing this period. 
 Following the legacy of Gayarré and later Ficklen and Lonn, a third period emerged, the 
so-called “Dunning School” of thought about Reconstruction Period. William Archibald 
Dunning taught at Columbia University in the early twentieth century. Dunning advocated for 
Reconstruction to be viewed as a Southern victory over Northern designs aimed at a 
revolutionary redesign. Rejecting a comprehensive approach, he favored a state-by-state 
approach to its examination.12 Adherents of Dunning’s ideas produced works on several states, 
but Louisiana stood conspicuously among those left unexplored. This exception prompted Willie 
Malvin Caskey’s Secession and Restoration of Louisiana, a history that fawned over both 
Ficklen and Dunning, and which took the idea of a coopted caste of freedmen further and 
presented them as a violent menace in need of state control.13 This characterization of federal 
efforts further indicated the influence of this school on historical inquiry. Dunning did contribute 
                                                 
11 Ella Lonn, Reconstruction in Louisiana After 1868 (1918 repr., New York: Russell & Russell, 1967). 
12 Wetta, The Louisiana Scalawags, 7.  
13 Willie Malvin Caskey, Secession and Restoration of Louisiana (1938. Reprint. New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1970),  xi-xii. Writing in the foreword, Frank L. Owsley in the foreword describes Dunning at the initiation of 
his work as “young,” well studied and “destined” to bring a “renaissance” in Southern history. Caskey’s work argues 
for an end to ideas of “reconstruction,” to be replaced with “reorganization.” 185-186. Caskey presents newspaper 
reports describing many freedmen in 1864 as “destitute,” “unsettled over false hopes,” and “to have gone constantly 
armed.” 
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to textbooks used in the United States, and his narrative of Southern victory, incompetent 
freedmen, and northern conspirators reached a national audience. Caskey, along with such 
entries as Fortier’s Carpet Bag Misrule: in Louisiana: The Tragedy of the Reconstruction Era 
Following the War Between the States: Louisiana’s Part in Maintaining White Supremacy in the 
South,14 served as a high-water mark of the Ficklen Thesis. 
 Ficklen and Dunning’s framing of this era, while influential and pervasive in the United 
States, did not go unchallenged or ignored by their contemporaries. In fact, Henry Clay 
Warmoth, still living in 1929, penned an autobiographical work War, Politics, and 
Reconstruction: Stormy Days in Louisiana15 to combat what he saw as flagrantly dishonest 
scholarship, particularly regarding his term as governor during Reconstruction. In his book he 
acknowledged his bias and the necessarily partisan nature of a firsthand account, but his defense 
of his policies and the efforts of his administration and their allies is one of the first shots across 
the bow of the prevailing historiography. 
 William Wallace Shugg’s The Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana: A Social History 
of White Farmers and Laborers During Slavery and After, 1840-1875,16 while not a direct 
history of Reconstruction itself, challenged the understanding of this era by using the tools of 
history in the study of class. To Shugg, Reconstruction in Louisiana reflected social upheaval not 
only of black slaves emancipated from the status of chattel chattel but poor whites liberated from 
political bondage. Poor whites and newly liberated blacks had a common station, Shugg argued, 
                                                 
14 Alcée Fortier, Carpet Bag Misrule in Louisiana: The Tragedy of the Reconstruction Era Following the 
War Between the States: Louisiana’s Part in Maintaining White Supremacy in the South (New Orleans: Louisiana 
State Museum, Press of T.J. Moran, 1938). 
15 Henry Clay Warmoth, War, Politics and Reconstruction: Stormy Days in Louisiana (New York: The 
McMillan Company, 1930). 
 16Roger Wallace Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana: A Social History of White Farmers During 
Slavery and After, 1840-1875 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939), 210, 222, 232-233. 
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and while the former did not accept parity with the latter, they did work together for common 
goals. The Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana periodized this era by constitutions (1852, 
1864, 1868, 1879) and framed the remarkable progressive document of 1864, with its ostensible 
desegregation, universal public education, limits on working hours and mandating of minimum 
wages as the government of “the people.” In this view, the Constitution of 1868 represented a 
stumbling block in which power was dramatically transferred to a dictatorial Republican 
majority before finally being returned to the great agricultural interests and bankers by 1879, 
basically regressing the state to its Antebellum social, political, and economic situation.17 Shugg 
saw the victory that Ficklen previously heralded, but in his mind that victory came to the upper 
class and not to the white southerner at large. 
  To Shugg, the Louisiana experiment represented a revolution, led by class interests and 
not one inherently racial, which is finally derailed by the merchant, banker, and planter interests 
of the state in 1879 in a counter-revolution, one ironic in its reactionary nature.18 These analyses 
complicate the Ficklin-Lonn narrative. Shugg directly attacks Ficklin’s arguments at one point. 
Ficklin had asserted that the votes of statewide interest being cast in wartime New Orleans were 
representative of a small portion of the state and therefore illegitimate. Shugg countered that the 
votes were nearly the same in number in the state’s wartime capital of Shreveport, the 
government implied as legitimate by Ficklin. Shugg futher criticized Ficklin for ignoring the 
“revolutionary” nature of the Constitution of 1864.19 The changed narrative during Louisiana’s 
Reconstruction experience put fundamental strain on the traditional narrative. 
 William Ivy Hair’s book Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, Louisiana Politics 1877-
                                                 
17Ibid., (X). Shugg even identifies the constitutions as 1864 favoring white labor interests, 1868 favoring 
black labor interests, and 1879 favoring white supremacy interests. 
18 Ibid., 196. 
19 Ibid., 201-204. 
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190020 boosted many of Shugg’s arguments, describing the battling class interests after what 
Shugg saw as a white supremacist, reactionary takeover in 1879. In his detailing of this period, 
he frequently returns to Reconstruction to account for the state of affairs in Louisiana from the 
end of that period to the turn of the century. Hair is one of the first historians who linked postwar 
levee reconstruction to politics in the state. He does this by linking the so-called “Penitentiary 
Ring,” which benefitted the holder of the statewide convict lease, to levee reconstruction 
efforts.21 While the book does not firstly concern Reconstruction in Louisiana, its exploration of 
the origins of conditions directly tied to events during Reconstruction paints a picture of the 
close of this era that is fundamentally incompatible with the Ficklen-Lonn Thesis.22 
 Despite flaws and prejudices, Ficklen’s and Lonn’s works remained the sole 
comprehensive accounting of this era in Louisiana’s history until publication of Joe Gray 
Taylor’s Louisiana Reconstructed.23 Taylor directly confronted the legacy of the Dunning School 
and the scholarship of the 1910s, seeking to forge a new and comprehensive study of this period. 
Louisiana Reconstructed provided an account of the entire period, from 1863 through 1877. The 
fresh examination looks at successive administrations overseeing the state, rather than using 
Constitutional regimes, as Shugg does. Taylor’s examination of the succession of power after the 
fall of New Orleans in May 1862 follows military rule, Warmoth’s administration, Kellogg’s 
                                                 
20Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 24. “[Bourbons] identified themselves with propertied interests 
and […] true Southern ideals […] rejected noblesse oblige implications of the Old South and unblushingly embraced 
Negrophobia which elsewhere was usually attributed to ignorant poor whites.” Hair uses “agrarian” for all those 
employed in agriculture, poor whites, rich whites, and freedmen alike. 
21 Ibid., 129-134. 
22 Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest, 278-279. Hair describes the consolidation of Bourbon Democrat 
power from the end of Reconstruction in 1877 to 1900, “The Negro had been removed as a direct political factor. 
White agrarianism had seemingly been crushed.” He also quotes one observer as reporting “The people are 
thoroughly cowed.” This epilogue differs from the image presented by Lonn in Reconstruction in Louisiana, 525. In 
her concluding chapter “Restoration of White Rule” the withdrawal of federal troops is presented as the curtain 
falling on the story, adding “if Louisiana had sinned, she had paid the penalty of her sins in full measure.” 
23 Joe Gray Taylor. Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University  
Press, 1974). 
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administration, and moved into the tenure of Governor Nicholls. Notably, Taylor included a 
preliminary foray into issues of culture, labor, and the economy, furthering the new avenues 
ventured by Origins of Class Struggle. Taylor agreed with Shugg’s analysis that the state 
underwent a reactionary counterrevolution favoring prewar interests in banking and planting. He 
maintained the idea that Louisiana in 1900 had essentially the same power-structure as in 1860.24 
 The new perspective offered by Louisiana Reconstructed contributed to a new wave of 
scholarship on the subject. Joseph G. Dawson’s Army Generals and Reconstruction25 returned 
the Yankee to the history of this era. Told from a mostly northern perspective, Army Generals 
and Reconstruction broke with the idea of military occupation and examines the role these 
officers played in the state during their tenure. What emerged is a more conciliatory picture of 
even-handed soldiers performing a myriad of duties across many subjects and performing what 
Dawson terms “remarkably well” given their post.26 James Peyton McCrary’s Abraham Lincoln 
and Reconstruction27 furthered restoration of missing federal military agency to the histories. 
McCrary challenged the prevailing view of Lincoln as a moderate and sought to tie 
Reconstruction closer to the realities of the war that preceded it.28. Ted Tunnell would later 
highlight the lack of understanding of exactly who the “unionists” were, furthering separation of 
this convenient array of interests.29 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 508. 
25 Joseph G. Dawson. Army Generals and Reconstruction in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978). 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Joseph Peyton McCrary. Abraham Lincoln and Reconstruction: The Louisiana Experiment (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1978).  
28 Ibid., 18, 355-56. McCrary viewed the Civil War as a revolutionary conflict and asserts “The end of 
revolutionary war is not arms but ideology.” He also highlighted the ongoing historiographical failure to identify and 
explain who the “scalawags” were, separating them from the carpetbaggers and freedmen with whom they are 
usually lumped. 
29 Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction: War, Radicalism and Race in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 6-7. 
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 Taylor’s recasting of the history of Louisiana during Reconstruction presaged by Eric 
Foner’s monumental work Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877.30 
Foner sought to focus on the “centrality of the freedman,” a group Foner read as the “most 
effective” agent during this period, and “central to reconstruction.”31 Foner explicitly confronted 
the image of “negro incapacity” popularized by the work of the Dunning School.32 This highly 
influential book even sought to move the date of the start of Reconstruction to the Emancipation 
Proclamation, rather than tying it to the Fall of New Orleans or any other military action. In a 
break with Taylor’s “series of essays” format, Foner rejected what he saw as 
compartmentalization of history into political, social, or economic fields, and sought instead to 
produce a coherent narrative of this period.33 
 More recent scholarship on this subject includes works on black politicians and local 
support for the Union cause. Charles Vincent’s Black Legislators in Louisiana During 
Reconstruction34 seeks to restore agency to a group viewed before Taylor’s work as agents of 
Republican designs at best or incompetent and violent at worst. Notably, Vincent addresses black 
legislators’ interaction with issues impacting the environment, including the chartering of the 
Louisiana Levee Company,35 oversight of the same along with other chartered state entities36 and 
even proposals from black politicians for legal protections for birds in the state.37 Frank J. 
Wetta’s book, The Louisiana Scalawags: Politics, Race, and Terrorism During the Civil War 
                                                 
30 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1988). 
31 Ibid., Reconstruction, xvii. 
32 Ibid., xix 
33 Ibid., xxvii 
34 Charles Vincent, Black Legislators in Louisiana During Reconstruction (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
Press, 2011). 
35 Ibid., 78. 
36 Ibid., 162-163. 
37 Ibid., 203. 
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and Reconstruction,38 makes headway into an accurate description of the so-called “scalawags” 
and “unionists,” vague monikers regularly imprecisely attached to carpetbaggers and freedmen. 
 Too often in the historiography of politics during Reconstruction Era Louisiana, the 
environmental conditions prevailing in the state are understated or ignored. For example, in 
Dawson’s Army Generals and Reconstruction, military officers reported on the rampant 
lawlessness of irregulars and criminal gangs in the state’s interior. These problems, Dawson 
argued, end with the conclusion of the war and the need for jobs for Confederate veterans.39 But 
the failure of the Union to pacify the Atchafalaya Basin region, due in large part to its 
environmental challenges affecting transport and logistics, cannot be discounted as a source of 
irregular military activity. If these reports cited by Dawson are accurate, could the particularly 
violent nature of Reconstruction in Louisiana be tied to widespread flooding of riparian parishes 
throughout the state? In most works written about Reconstruction in Louisiana, the areas outside 
the major urban and political centers in the state, as well as the unique and deterministic natural 
world within this area, are completely absent from the historiography. 
The Environmental History of the American Civil War 
 The application of environmental history to the historical study of the Civil War can be 
traced to an article by Jack Temple Kirby, “The American Civil War: An Environmental View,” 
published online by the National Humanities Center in 2001.40 Kirby argued for the importance 
of an “ecological” view of the conflict, given the environmental consciousness of contemporary 
society and the twentieth century’s lessons on industrial war as “an ecological disaster,” a 
                                                 
38 Wetta, The Louisiana Scalawags. 
39 Joseph G. Dawson, Army Generals and Reconstruction in Louisiana, 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 29. 
40 Lisa Brady, War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes 
During the American Civil War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012). 
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condition and a notion absent from earlier scholarship.41 Eleven years later, Lisa Brady published 
War Upon the Land: Military Strategy and the Transformation of Southern Landscapes during 
the American Civil War.42 Brady’s book became the first attempt to turn an environmental lens 
on a well-known conflict with a copious historiography. War Upon the Land examines first the 
Lower Mississippi River and the interaction of strategy and a large, dynamic system, paying 
attention to an environmental analysis of the Union’s efforts to capture Vicksburg. Second, the 
book looks at the ordeal of Sherman’s March in the Confederacy’s east, framing his destruction 
as a show of control over nature, rather than a wanton act of terror. Throughout, she gives space 
to voices of soldiers, officers and civilians whose awareness of the land around them heretofore 
took second to the urgency of battle and maneuver. 
 Shortly after Brady’s work appeared, Megan Kate Nelson published Ruin Nation: 
Destruction and the American Civil War.43 Ruin Nation represented a cultural and environmental 
history, examining cases throughout the conflict and the effect of the war’s physical destruction 
on American landscapes and society. Examining physical environments, Nelson traced the path 
of national trauma and the ways in which American society coped (or buried) the ravages of the 
nation’s bloodiest of wars. Her examination of the “ruins” of war go beyond the standard 
textbook account of events, examining the ruins of cities, forests, social culture, and even bodies 
of casualties, both maimed and destroyed. Nelson’s work expands upon Brady’s earlier work and 
pushes forward the vast possibilities of reexamining the Civil War with new modes of research. 
 Kathryn Shively Meier’s Nature’s Civil War: Common Soldiers and the Environment in 
                                                 
41 Jack Temple Kirby, “The American Civil War: An Environmental View.” National Humanities Center. 
http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/nattrans/ntuseland/essays/amcwar.html. (accessed November 21, 2018). 
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1862 Virginia44 explored the relationships and causalities between the men fighting the war and 
the natural world around them. Meier looked to the first-hand accounts of soldiers as in War 
Upon the Land, taking the history of the conflict to a basic level and building up a work in an 
environmental frame.45 She expounded upon the relationships of soldiers to the land around 
them, particularly to forests, as in Ruin Nation, but introduced a case study of the Peninsular and 
Shenandoah Campaigns, adding to the wartime cases laid out by Brady. 
 A significant contribution to the environmental history of the American Civil War is the 
publication of a collection of essays for the University of Georgia’s UnCivil War series, The 
Blue, the Gray, and the Green: Toward and Environmental History of the Civil War.46 Edited by 
Brian Allen Drake, the volume contains ten essays from different contributors whose research 
spans the scope of the conflict. This provocative volume shared similarities with an edited 
volume by Tucker and Russell47 edited by Richard Tucker and Edmund Russell that gathered 
articles and made a persuasive argument for the examination of the environmental history of war. 
Drake’s collection supports the path of this scholarship, including works by Brady, Nelson and 
Meier, but gave voice to new scholars as well. 
 The environmental history of the Civil War continues to produce compelling scholarship. 
Erin Stewart Mauldin, a student of historian J.R. McNeill, published “The Stockman’s War: Hog 
Cholera and the Fight for the Open Range in Reconstruction Era Alabama”48 which examined 
epizootic events in western Alabama precipitated by the movement of animals during wartime 
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and charts the effects of disease on postwar political and social struggles. Her expansive view 
continued to develop in her book Unredeemed Land: An Environmental History of Civil War and 
Emancipation in the Cotton South,49 where she further examines the changed landscapes of the 
postwar era and how it affected southerners, particularly sharecroppers. Mauldin made the 
argument that the course of the Civil War and Emancipation “tore off the mask” of underlying 
environmental issues surrounding the southern agrarian model.50 This paper contributes to this 
notion through its contribution to the environmental history of slavery. 
 While this body of work concerning the environment and the Civil War has proven 
expansive and at times groundbreaking, since Brady’s War Upon the Land explored the 
relationship of strategists around the Vicksburg campaign, no significant attention has been paid 
to the legacies of the war in the area of controlling water. Brady stops at the Vicksburg stretch of 
the Mississippi River, more than a hundred miles above its intersection with the Atchafalaya. 
This paper will contribute to a new direction in this field as well as contribute to intersectional 
works like that of Lisa Brady. 
 Other works of particular relevance to this historiography reach into the worlds of other 
river systems in the world. Richard White’s The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the 
Columbia River51 revealed the potential of a complete history of a river system, both organically 
and in its interaction with human designs upon its course, control, and management. This paper’s 
description of the forging of new paradigms for the maintenance of an anthropologically altered 
water system is in keeping with White’s fascinations. Another book of importance is Ling 
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Zhang’s The River, the Plain, and the State: An Environmental Drama in Northern Song China, 
1048-1128.52 In it, Zhang examined the course and changes brought about by state attempts to 
manage a catastrophic, generational shift in the course of the Yellow River. Finally, it is notable 
to mention the influence of James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State,53 a work of political science 
relevant to the intellectual foundations of this and other inquiries. Scott’s highlighting of the 
limitations of what a state can “see” in its interactions with both the natural and constructed 
worlds illuminate this and other works. 
Though some of these works are far removed from the American Civil War and its 
legacy, they illuminate the direction of the work of this thesis going forward, just as it 
contributes to specific areas of environmental history. As in The Stockman’s War, this paper 
seeks to expand understanding of the political and environmental effects of human interaction 
with a dynamic, hydrological system. 
This paper will contribute to these three areas of the historical literature by arguing for 
the extension of an environmental lens into the examination of mid-nineteenth century 
Louisiana. The state’s environmental challenges are reflected in the disposition and formation of 
its structure as it moves through history. Inclusion of the environment in analyzing some major 
themes running through the intricate period of Reconstruction in Louisiana provides for a fuller 
understanding of this era.  
By examining the physical effects of war, this work will contribute to the field of 
environmental history, particularly to that of the American Civil War. And as in Meier’s 
Unredeemed Land, it makes substantial inroads into the largely untapped well of the 
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environmental history of the institution of slavery in the Antebellum South. 
The Origin of Louisiana’s Levee Complex  
 The colonization and settlement of colonial southern Louisiana involved not only the 
perennial labors of land clearing, property allotment, and demarcation. It included added layers 
of complexity necessary because of the alluvial and wetland character present throughout much 
of the region. Regular flooding by nutrient-rich systems like the Mississippi and Atchafalaya 
rivers fed soil to an intensely rich degree, highly suitable for agriculture, but the flooding also 
hindered favorable conditions needed for constant occupation and European agricultural 
processes. Because of this disruption, settlers in New Orleans, along the German Coast and 
westward into the Atchafalaya Basin region needed to not only drain and develop land, but also 
to regularly attend to keeping out water displaced by their activities. 
 French settler interests founded New Orleans upon a natural high ridge of land along a 
long, crescent-shaped bend running roughly parallel to Lake Pontchartrain to its north. This ridge 
was not the only such formation in the area, but the areas between these ridges was susceptible to 
flooding and soon thereafter levee construction began in order to develop the areas between the 
high grounds, or levee crests.54 These natural areas of high ground were not unique to the New 
Orleans area, and similar conditions would recur throughout the alluvial and swamp regions 
further south and west.55 The practice of constructing rigid “floodwalls” of earth to keep water 
channels from spilling into the surrounding areas was a well-established one and can be traced to 
the work in the 1600s of an Italian engineer, Domenico Guglielmini. 56 In Louisiana, such efforts 
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date from the beginning of French settlement at Natchitoches in 1714. Construction of levees to 
connect the ridges along flood-prone waterways allowed for land reclamation outside of these 
natural formations, but their variations in height complicated regulatory attempts to standardize 
levee dimensions.57 These ridges, combined with a system of natural levees produced by alluvial 
forces, produced water barriers sometimes three miles inland from waterways.58 These 
formations illustrate the patchwork of flood threats of variable danger facing European arrivals 
in the region, and foreshadow the complex nature of prospective flood control measures.59 
The construction of levees as a precursor to European settlement was aided by the 
favorable conditions provided by crests and ridges that settlers found throughout the region, with 
the arduous task of levee maintenance. Plantation agriculture in south Louisiana needed access to 
the river, near the main waterways and by extension to the most proximate danger. Farmers’ 
margins demanded access to shipping, and plantation “landings” were preferably built along 
levees in areas described resignedly as “first to flood, first to dry.”60 Vigilance along the levees 
proved essential, especially in confronting the issue of the dreaded levee crevasse. If the river 
were to break through the levee, it would begin to empty water into the lower, adjacent dry land. 
This flow of water, if left unchecked, tended to press the downriver earthwork head-on, rapidly 
eroding its height, grinding it down along its flank, with the potential to erase miles of an 
otherwise formidable barrier. This demonstrates the essential role that constant attention plays in 
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levee upkeep and the potentially devastating effects of inattention to these earthworks.61 
 Before the American Civil War erupted in 1861, the levee system in south Louisiana, 
while in no way impervious to flooding, had reached some basic stability due to the realities of 
the plantation system. Most successful plantations abutted waterways, giving access to the 
markets in New Orleans and Morgan City,62 which meant there would be eyes on the physical 
levees. Slavery meant an available force of laborers to maintain without wage costs affixed to 
manpower. 
 The falling tide of the Civil War in Louisiana meant an end to both slavery and the 
Antebellum plantation economy. What plantations persisted were subsumed into the burgeoning 
mill system, particularly those engaged in sugar cultivation,63 constituting a majority of the 
planter interests in the Atchafalaya Basin and along the lower Mississippi River.64 Before the 
Civil War the plantation system had provided some security from inundation, but their postwar 
condition meant there would be practically none. 
The Hydraulics of the American Civil War in Louisiana 
 The American Civil War would prove to be the single most decisive event in the 
transformation of Louisiana’s levee system, and with it the politics of the state. Before the war, 
the plantation system had managed to reach deep into the interior of the Atchafalaya Basin and 
along the Mississippi River. Armies of slave laborers toiled to erect and maintain uneven—if 
vulnerable—mounds of earth for water control, the results of their labor was a relatively reliable 
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and decidedly extensive system. By 1866 the damage resulting from the war rendered much of 
the Atchafalaya Basin impassable to waterborne commerce.65 This situation resulted from triplet 
causes: regular warfighting, irregular—particularly Jayhawker—combatant activity, and neglect. 
Regular warfare began in Louisiana with the Union drive to capture New Orleans. At the 
start of hostilities the city’s defenses relied on the downriver Forts Jackson and St. Philip, whose 
capture in April of 1862 ended any chance of real resistance. With only a small contingent of 
soldiers assigned for land defense, the likely results of a siege would have been pyrrhic for 
Confederate defenders, at best. Though the city had already been under a blockade from the Gulf 
of Mexico, the reality of the Union forces’ arrival shocked the city, which promptly 
surrendered.66 
The capture of New Orleans did not deliver control of the Mississippi River to the Union 
by any measure. It became clear to Union war planners that control of the river would be a 
practical impossibility until Confederate strongholds of Port Hudson and Vicksburg above the 
city were captured. Until then, the river would remain contested, the Confederacy relatively 
whole, and the Confederate project practically viable. Both of these fortresses were located on 
the eastern bank, and effective encirclement would require a western bank solution. In the 
months following the fall of New Orleans, war planners realized that supply lines running from 
Texas into the greater Confederacy represented reliable sources of cattle, corn, and other staples 
necessary for the continuation of the rebellion in the medium term.67 Gaining control of both 
banks of the river would place Louisiana’s great rivers and bayous in the crosshairs of Union war 
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aims in the Department of the Gulf. The stage was set for the expansion of the war into the 
state’s interior.68 
 Union forces managed to advance upriver and capture the state capital of Baton Rouge on 
August 5, 1862, but the “brief and violent” clash, while delivering the city to the Union, halted 
the Union advance upriver.69 Long supply lines running from New Orleans upriver to Baton 
Rouge proved vulnerable to attacks by Confederate forces, further complicating security along 
the captured banks.70 In a demonstration of the interplay of these issues, during an October 4, 
1862 river skirmish, Union gunboats disrupted a Confederate attempt to drive 1,500 head of 
cattle across the Mississippi upriver from New Orleans, capturing the lot.71 The difficulties faced 
by Union forces in their efforts to pacify this portion of the river would only intensify with their 
next move westward, deeper into the state’s interior. 
 Union war planners’ efforts to find a way to move northward effectively for an 
encirclement of Port Hudson and Vicksburg were consistently frustrated by the environmental 
difficulties of operating in Louisiana’s topography. Reliable routes through the Atchafalaya 
Basin proved elusive, with changing water levels and natural hazards making any significant 
force vulnerable.72 Union forces committed to an advance up the western edge of the 
Atchafalaya Basin, along Bayou Teche, ultimately succeeding in their efforts to encircle the 
stubborn Confederate holdouts. With this successful encirclement, Vicksburg fell on July 4 and 
Port Hudson on July 9, 1863. With that the Confederacy was bisected.73 
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Figure 2. The routes of the Union advance from New Orleans.74 Note the westward move around the 
Atchafalaya Basin. 
The damage inflicted by this conventional campaigning proved serious for the entire 
region. Physical damage to structures and improvements followed in the wake of military 
maneuvers without regard for property. Parts of once reliable levees were systematically 
destroyed along major and minor waterways in the south-eastern and central parts of the state,75 
which had seen most of the regular fighting. The ruination of many plantation buildings, stores 
of equipment, seizure of food and supplies for the war effort proved devastating to the economy 
                                                 
74 Henry Lindenkohl and A.D. Bache, Military Map of Part of Louisiana [map]. 1863. 1:390,000. United 
States Coast Survey. Retrieved from Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/item/99447190/ (accessed April 
2019). 
75 Reuss, Designing the Bayous, 54-55. 
24 
 
 of the region.76 Displacement of people, planters, poor whites and blacks alike represented the 
end of the plantation economy in the Atchafalaya Basin and along the Mississippi River.77 The 
city of New Orleans evaded the destruction wrought on the countryside by the war.78 However, 
the damaging floodwaters that struck the state in 1862 followed by worse in 1865 proved early 
indicators of the damage that had been sustained by the protective levee system. 79 
 To account for the scale of the damage into the interior of the Atchafalaya Basin and 
along the Mississippi River, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of irregular warfare on the 
levee system and the conditions that such fighting imposed on efforts to maintain what systems 
remained. The Union Army’s solicitation for contractors to repair certain levees along the 
Mississippi in 1865 specifically offered “protection” to workers.80 This casual clause at the end 
of hostilities quietly echoes the real scale of insecurity endured by the central and southern parts 
of the state from the beginning of the Union invasion to the end of the war. 
 The progress of the war in south-central Louisiana greatly impacted the world of steam-
powered water transportation. Disruptions in and along the waterways of the Atchafalaya Basin 
began before the first shots were fired. Steamboats, critical to commerce in this region, faced 
seizure and use in logistical and warship service by both sides,81 removing them from use by 
inelastic commercial and civilian logistical purposes. Many slaves also fled as Union forces 
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arrived in the region,82 scattering labor resources. Given that both sides had resorted to 
conscription earlier in 1862, the progress of fighting in this region might accurately be classified 
as total war. 
The Union would spearhead every offensive it undertook along Louisiana’s rivers and 
bayous with armed steamers, while the Confederates would utilize these vessels to form the 
strongest points of their defenses in the region;83 this tactical environment makes the activity of 
the engaged steamer forces an important indicator of the prevailing environmental conditions in 
the Atchafalaya Basin and along its tributaries. For the activity of these large boats was 
inextricably linked to prevailing water levels. Before the war, the geographic reach of steamships 
into western Louisiana’s interior and the times of year this was possible (due to water levels) and 
were important factors in economic and infrastructural development.84 During the war, economic 
and infrastructural variables were replaced by military confrontation and collateral destruction. 
While the Union drive up the Teche was ultimately successful in encircling Vicksburg and Port 
Hudson, irregular activity like that dogging Union forces along the Mississippi River during the 
war proved intense and worsened as the war continued.85 This situation is a factor in the postwar 
situation along Louisiana’s waterways. The relationship between the long course of the First 
Bayou Teche Campaign and this encircling movement also stresses the scale of these geographic 
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challenges and the broad strategic entanglement of Louisiana’s waterways. 
As the Union forces advanced along the extremes of the Atchafalaya Basin, some 
retreating Confederates seem to have fled into the interior of the swamp, joining a growing 
population of displaced persons. Soon after the offensive began from New Orleans to Baton 
Rouge in 1862, irregular activity increased along the supply lines between those cities.86 This 
was repeated along other waterways proximate to the area, and the situation intensified into a 
classical guerilla war.87 Union forces were unwilling to engage in raids to clear these irregulars 
without gunboat support as low water was dangerous to ships traversing the bayous.88 1864 was 
one such year, and it saw the formation of an entire network of Confederate and Jayhawker89 
positions built throughout the swamps, which Union war planners classified as the “most 
significant military threat in South Louisiana” at that time. Rising water enabled one retaliatory 
raid in which Union forces destroyed a large camp in plain sight on Bayou Portage including a 
barracks for three hundred men, boats and supplies. 90 
 Near Plaquemine, raiders proved adept at targeting only plantations operated by federal 
surrogates during Union General Nathaniel P. Banks’ wartime labor scheme to the point where 
arming freedmen saw serious consideration. The irregular warfare was not confined to Union 
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targets. Attacks emanating from the Basin struck plantations operated by both loyalists and 
government operatives, to the protest of their former masters.91 
 The damage sustained by the levee system in Louisiana during the American Civil War 
can therefore be said have three main, interrelated causes. First, the impact of regular warfare 
upon the built environments caused direct damage to many levees and water control structures 
during actual campaigning. Second, the same topographical and hydrological conditions that 
rendered the region vulnerable to flooding ante bellum exacerbated the irregular conflict. Finally, 
neglect of these structures during the war caused widespread failures that would require more 
capital for repair than would have been necessary for regular upkeep. This neglect was caused in 
part by the radical labor shifts brought on by invasion of a liberating force, both real and 
perceived, but also significantly by the contested, insecure environment brought on and sustained 
by prolonged irregular warfare between multiple actors. 
Postbellum Physical, Labor, and Political Realities in Louisiana 
Even before the end of the war, Union General Nathaniel Banks found himself facing 
what would become the complex aftermath of the issue of labor. He vastly expanded an earlier, 
more limited initiative begun by his predecessor and on February 3, 1863, he issued General 
Order 23. In moralizing terms reminiscent of the Emancipation Proclamation of thirty-four days 
earlier, this directive amounted to a full reorganization of the labor system in Union-controlled 
Louisiana.92  
Banks’ 1863 order struck at the intersection of the difficult issues of emancipation and 
labor, what Peyton McCrary terms a “halfway house between slavery and freedom.” Banks 
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sought to require “emancipated” slaves to work, offering them guaranteed pay and certain 
familial and bodily protections.93 In a personal case study of what would face the reconstituted 
Louisiana authorities, Banks had devised a compromise between the realities of labor shortages 
and the end of slavery, one which did not exist before his order posted and would not emerge 
again after the war. As strange as this system must have seemed to freedmen, the solution 
seemed to alleviate the question of labor. It simultaneously served the humanitarian purpose of 
temporarily alleviating poor conditions in the crowded “contraband camps” of landless freedmen 
that had begun to grow around Union lines.94 Beyond these purposes, however, there is the 
reality that these workers, whatever the nuance of their station, were also available for and were 
utilized for levee work.95 Even if poor management-labor relations led to a ruined harvest, which 
did occur,96 perhaps a semi-static labor presence might be preferable to preserve physical 
properties. Banks’ experience in the war at this point would undoubtedly have informed his 
understanding of the dangers of flooding in Louisiana, particularly his participation in the First 
Bayou Teche Campaign. 
 The issue of the newly-freed population was made central in Eric Foner’s 1988 book, 
Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, and surely members of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau would have agreed. As Louisiana’s government continued in its amorphous state, shifting 
between occupied land, semi-self-governed state, and rebel territory, this federal organization, 
designed to address the condition of the emancipated in the reconsolidating South, also found 
itself ensnared by Louisiana’s watery topography. In 1865, the Bureau determined Louisiana 
possessed three million acres of available public land, under public domain of the state, that 
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could be set aside for the (re-)settlement of Louisiana’s newly freed population. Much of this 
land proved to be practically unsuitable: swampy, flood-prone locales that would require 
draining, preparation, and levee construction. The capital making the land habitable in these 
locations at this scale was as it was elsewhere in the state, simply unavailable.97 That the levees 
constructed and maintained largely by enslaved blacks, sometimes for generations, were now 
beyond their benefit in the aftermath of the war that liberated them from bondage is a strange 
moment indeed. 
 The new realities of Emancipation provided many challenges for the states of the South 
and their estranged federal partner. The creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau, the amending of the 
United States Constitution three times, and other legal measures designed, modified, and 
implemented throughout the South might seem similar to the changes experienced in the 
interaction of Louisiana’s alluvial problems and its state institutions, but they were 
fundamentally different in an important, yet subtle way—namely, that the freedmen represented 
a human constituency, one that acted and reacted to conditions around it, though it had been 
deprived of such agency in national memory.98 The natural environmental systems that Louisiana 
faced during this period were dynamic as well, but they were intrinsically recursive: and in that, 
they were specific and reactive. If studied sufficiently, they have the potential to be understood 
and predicted. This impulsive force is unlike an individual or a constituency, which possesses 
natural agency and is beyond the dynamic and into the realm of chaos. 
 The realities of physical damage sustained throughout the state’s waterways became plain 
after the end of the war. Natural and man-made obstruction plagued many bayous. Collapsed 
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plantation structures, sunken steamships and even live mines joined the accumulating driftwood 
to render the Atchafalaya Basin impassable below Bayou Plaquemine. 99 In some areas the scale 
of the damage was unknown: in 1866 there were areas still inundated from the war, and it was 
unknown what had been left below the muddy waters.100 
The State’s Postbellum Incarceration System 
With the evaporation of slave labor for the construction and maintenance of levees, a 
dangerous and expensive enterprise,101 the availability of human labor under the total control of 
state authorities now factored into calculations just as with Antebellum planters. Convicts 
serving sentences in state penal institutions represented a pool of captive labor. The incarcerated 
faced exploitation by Louisiana for state-enterprise (CARDON) purposes before the American 
Civil War,102 significantly off-setting the costs of their incarceration. As tools of marginal 
expense reduction, the employment of these individuals in the reconstruction of levees is not a 
surprising postwar development. However, the scale of the state’s commitment to the project and 
the mortality rates the contracted convicts faced there, especially in the face of state attempts at 
oversight, represent a transformation of the state-level prison system into a neo-chattel system 
not unlike the evolution of slaves to freedmen and finally to sharecroppers. This transition did 
not come as a response to market forces, but rather to the state’s engagement with the unstable 
alluvial and swamp systems of the Lower Mississippi Valley. 
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The decades-old practice of using convict labor in Louisiana changed after emancipation 
and the coming of a (relatively) free labor system. Instances of commercializing convict labor in 
Louisiana date to 1844,103 but the idea of using prisoners for public enterprises begins to appear 
in public sentiments across multiple publications in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
Concerns included food availability and demonstrated awareness of the changed labor and 
economic system in the state.104 Statements by authorities likewise reflected this postwar 
attitude. R.T. Posey, a judge serving on the bench for the Fifth Judicial District Court in New 
Orleans, appealed to the jury to consider putting an accused to work, explicitly citing jail 
capacities and a need for labor in the public interest.105 These kinds of publications and 
statements represent a fundamental shift in attitudes towards incarceration and the role of the 
penal system. It is in this environment that levee reconstruction, as an urgent issue requiring state 
solutions, emerged. 
The scale of the challenge of controlling river flooding in Louisiana is in evidence 
immediately following the war. Policymakers did not initially grasp the whole view of the task 
they faced—the transition from plantation interest to public works mandate did not come easily, 
in part because no state effort on this scale had ever been attempted in Louisiana.106 In a 
solicitation of contracts for levee construction, the headquarters of the Department of the Gulf in 
New Orleans’ Office of the Provost Marshal under Major General Hurlburt offered some firm 
parameters these tasks required at the parish-level. This January 5, 1865, announcement called 
for the movement of 200,000 cubic feet of earth in West Baton Rouge Parish and another 
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125,000 cubic feet in upriver Point Coupee Parish by March 15 of that year.107 This represents a 
solicitation for a tremendous amount of manpower.108 General Hurlburt’s office offered military 
protection to the contractor and his workforce,109 which is doubly telling. It indicates a continued 
insecurity along the route of the Mississippi River south of its fork with the Atchafalaya and 
north of Bayou Manchac. Secondly, it offers a window on what the Union military had to offer 
in levee building efforts. Soliciting manpower indicates an absence of earth-moving machinery 
or animal power at the disposal of the Gulf Department’s authority. The arrival of these kinds of 
contracts spelled an end to the previous practice of local regulations and fines for landowners as 
a means of ensuring levee maintenance. 
By 1865, Louisiana’s state government found itself short on money and deep in both debt 
and new responsibilities for flood control in the Atchafalaya Basin and along the Lower 
Mississippi River. These conditions, coupled with a reliable pool of labor represented by a 
burgeoning prisoner population,  were prime factors for the substitution of one system of forced 
labor by another, although this outcome was neither inevitable nor immediate.110 However, by 
1871, with the system’s ultimate endurance, the sourcing of leased prisoners for levee 
reconstruction became a general reality. While prisoners sometimes helped with railroad 
construction, the vast majority of convict labor found itself assigned to flood control work.111 As 
state efforts to contain the waters of the 
     Atchafalaya and Mississippi rivers intensified following seasonal flooding into the 1870s, the     
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Figure 3. Convict labor at work on a levee along the Atchafalaya River, circa 1899.112 
prisoner population saw steady increases. Between 1867 and 1877, the number of convicts under 
the state’s custody nearly tripled,113 and the prewar demographic saw a reversal, from a 3:1 
white-to-black ratio immediately before the war to a 1:3 ratio reported by the holder of the 
largest prison contract. This deepening nexus of interests between the state, contractors and the 
prison system is only further tightened by contemporary accounts that the prisoner leasing “ring” 
in final form proved a second only to the infamous Louisiana Lottery Ring by observers.114 The 
prisoner lease became another example of how Louisiana’s institutions found public projects 
intertwined with their relationship with water. 
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Centralization by Monopoly: The Louisiana Levee Company 
In 1871, the availability of convict labor and the poor finances of the state produced 
conditions ideal for state chartering out of its responsibilities. The same day it advanced bills 
establishing the Crescent City Waterworks in New Orleans, the Louisiana House of 
Representatives moved forward with a new act authorizing the establishment of a “Louisiana 
Levee Company.” This new entity would constitute a “body politic and corporate, with certain 
powers, privileges and franchises,” according to the act, and be a vehicle for state contracts 
aimed at levee maintenance and repair.115 The disparity between the waterworks bill and the 
levee bill is striking due to the potential revenues a monopolized levee contract company with 
such a broad mandate might expect in Louisiana’s postwar environment. While investors in the 
new waterworks initiative might expect handsome returns on a public works entity in the largest 
city in the state, the Levee Company’s “market” dwarfed even it.116 Upon the company’s 
chartering and the appointment of its board, the firm’s obligations included the regulatory 
mandate to move three million cubic feet of soil per year “until said levees shall be completed 
according to the standard required.”117 This ambition, especially in light of Major General 
Hurlburt’s 1865 solicitation for raising 325,000 cubic feet in two parishes,118 represents an 
massive project. 
The debate on the constitutionality of the Louisiana Levee Company represents the scale 
of innovation provoked by contemporary extraordinary environmental conditions and the 
motivation for its creation ties together two important, interrelated threads—those of legality and 
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flood control. The influence of this organization is underscored by litigation between the 
company and the state treasury which reached the Louisiana Supreme Court in April of 1873. In 
seeking to meet its regulatory obligations, the company reportedly had executed $707,000 worth 
of repair and maintenance work during the two years following the passage of the Levee Act on 
February 20, 1871, yet report compensation of only $400,000. When the company filed with the 
state auditor’s office for a treasury warrant to withdraw some $18,000 held by the state 
designated for levee work, State Auditor Charles Clinton refused on constitutional grounds. The 
company faced the state attorney general in the state supreme court shortly thereafter.119 
The court case of the auditor’s clash with the Louisiana Levee Company brings to light 
possible motivations behind the state’s chartering of this entity, emphasized fractures within the 
divided state’s ruling factions, and highlights the kind of plots that the waters flowing over the 
banks of the state brought to Reconstruction Louisiana. Charles Clinton bolstered his stand 
against the company by virtue of the elected nature of his office, and was helped by the strength 
of his counterpart, the similarly elected treasurer.120 With the Attorney General, Clinton levelled 
a constitutional case against payouts to the company. His arguments before the court were 
threefold. First, he cited constitutional amendments limiting state debt and, citing Articles 110, 
114, and 115 of the Louisiana Constitution of March 1868, he argued that the act’s payout 
provisions constituted an effort to sideline provisions on debt, including general articles of the 
basic law. Second, he argued that the payments requested represent an unallowable request by a 
private entity to gain access to state funds. Third, Clinton asserted that neither the legislature nor 
the governor had the ability to authorize the present situation in the first place, as the property 
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owners had already assumed obligations vis-à-vis flood control when they acquired the 
threatened land parcels.121 These three arguments threatened the whole architecture of the 
company-state system and the 21-year contract now in force. 
The constitutional argument of the resulting case122 is particularly relevant to Louisiana’s 
ongoing attempts to find solutions to the dogged problems continued flooding events presented 
in the context of a relatively democratic system feeling the constraints of a basic law like the 
Constitution of 1868. While Article 114 and 115 citations are largely technical,123 Article 110 
explicitly calls into question the notion of a public utility and whether the company represented 
one: 
“ART 110.--No ex post facto or retroactive law, nor any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed; nor vested rights be divested, unless for 
purposes of public utility and for adequate compensation made.” 124 
 
This article, combined with amended limits setting state debt loads at $25 million 
emphasize the stresses brought by the company to the structure of the state’s legal and 
lawmaking institutions. If one accepts Clinton’s arguments, the state’s chartering of the 
Louisiana Levee Company would then represent an establishment of contracts for private 
utility, and critically, represent a scheme to sideline debt ceilings by transferring public 
obligations to a private obligation feeding from public taxes. This would be contrary to the 
law in spirit if not in practice. 
 On May 21, 1873, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in favor of the company, 
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settling the issue as one of constitutionality, finding that the debts incurred by the company 
were not debts entered into by the state legislature.125 This ruling is significant because the 
state’s obligation to the company represented a de facto role for the state as guarantor for 
the company’s debts in this arrangement. The legislature, facing urgent needs to fund its 
efforts in this area, essentially invented a solution by which it end-ran constitutional 
restraints and reaped new debt instruments, a clear indication of institutional innovation 
under pressure from an environmental system. Additionally, the precedent set by this case 
represented an immediate reality for litigants, both private and civil, before Louisiana’s 
courts. 
 This 1873 case would linger not only in precedent, but instead entered into the text 
Louisiana’s fundamental law six years later. The Louisiana Constitution of 1879’s authors 
specifically cite this case in carrying over bond issues from the previous regime. Leaving no 
room for argument, it specifically authorizes both the State Treasurer and State Auditor to 
endorse warrants to reimburse the outstanding expenses incurred by the Company.126 
The “Levee Cases” 
 The court’s decision in Clinton would not be the end of litigation surrounding the 
Louisiana Levee Company, nor was it the first such example. The power of precedent in the 
formation of the contours of a governmental system framed around the idea of separation of 
powers are inescapable. In pressing its case in Clinton, the company established its financial 
arrangements as constitutional and the state would be able to use the company’s access to the 
bond market to generate capital that it could not take up itself. The later institutionalization of the 
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repayment of these debts under the terms of the later Constitution of 1879127 would complete the 
life cycle of this arrangement. An examination of the relevant case law surrounding this 
company reveals the reach of this arrangement’s impact upon Louisiana and in some cases 
beyond its borders. 
 The first of these “Levee Cases” was Policy Jury v. Tardos (1870). Heard the year before 
the Levee Company was established, it concerned a landowner who contested the Jefferson 
Parish Police Jury’s authority to demand remuneration for a levee it constructed on his land. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the laws requiring landowners to maintain their own levees 
were voided by both legislative action and the orders of General Sheridan years prior.128 This 
case would be cited in the company’s defense against Clinton’s assertion that landowners were 
still legally obligated to maintain their own property’s levees. The courts were asked to intervene 
again in State ex rel. Bach v. Louisiana Levee Co. (1873) involving internal affairs of the levee 
boards’ administration and Governor Warmoth’s role in it,129 so by the time Clinton came before 
the justices they were aware of some of the issues surrounding the company. 
 State v. Maginnis (1874) is an example of the reach and significance of the precedent set 
by the Levee Cases. A landowner disputed the ability of an assessor to fix the rate of taxation on 
his property. This is significant first because the question of whether these rates can be set absent 
a law and secondly because the plaintiff argued again the issue of debt creation. The court used 
Clinton to settle this matter, ruling for the state. This ruling would be cited by no less than six 
other cases in subsequent years,130 including cases as far away as Muskogee Michigan (Fay v. 
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Wood (1887))131 and Seattle, Washington, (Smith v. Seattle (1901)). The case in Seattle itself 
would be cited by some eighteen other cases as precedent in the prevailing years.132  
 The company found itself a defendant in significant cases with the potential to threaten its 
survival as the 1870s went on. In Louque v. Louisiana Levee Co. (1875), the company narrowly 
avoided a court ruling on its liability to damages incurred by landowners by crevasses through an 
administrative technicality,133 and in White v. Louisiana Levee Co. (1875) it successfully 
navigated the complicated legal areas of contracts and succession.134 Choppin & Beard v. 
Louisiana Levee Co. (1878) would tie up the loose ends in the Louque decision, affirming the 
company’s responsibility to be to the state and not any private property interests or owners.135 
 In a case foreshadowing the coming legal battle with the rise of the corporation in the late 
nineteenth century, Montgomery v. Louisiana Levee Co. (1878) requested that the court 
determine where the company lived. Given that a person had to the right to utilize courts where 
the offender was domiciled, it was argued successfully that the company, headquartered as it 
was, along with its president, in New Orleans, was a resident within that jurisdiction. Court 
proceedings cited this case eighteen times in the coming years.136 It was even critical to the 
outcome of a surprisingly lengthy court decision fifty-seven years later concerning a man bitten 
by a dog in Tripani v. Meraux (1935).137 
 The state found its position from the Clinton case reversed in the company’s final years 
as Louisiana Levee Co. v. State (1878) saw the company suing Louisiana after it tried to limit by 
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statute how much of the money owed it by the public could be extracted from the treasury.138 
The court declined to reverse its earlier ruling and the company prevailed. 
 Whenever governments enact innovative policies, they are in a sense testing what their 
powers are. In systems such as those in the United States, the courts’ interpretation of these 
powers is critical to defining their scope and durability. The disposition and action of a state such 
as Louisiana in this period is inextricably informed by the nature of its powers. The Levee Cases 
stem mostly from the innovative nature of the Louisiana Levee Company and the legacies of its 
years in operation, but they are important in not only understanding the state’s abilities but also 
in demonstrating another vector by which the environment shaped a state exercising control over 
it. The waters flowing into the Gulf of Mexico are essentially an unlisted amicus curiae in many 
of these cases before Louisiana’s courts. Finally, the legal history helps in understanding what 
kinds of issues dogged the company during its existence, and provide a fuller accounting of its 
legal life. 
The Constitutional Legacies of Reconstruction Era Flooding 
 The legacy of Louisiana Levee Company vs. the State of Louisiana and its importance in 
Louisiana’s legal history is evidenced by the specific, explicit inclusion of its central concerns in 
the body of the Constitution of 1879. The case is identified by name, even by case number, in a 
section devoted to miscellaneous ordinances. The constitution dedicates a portion of levee taxes 
for the repayment of debts owed the company, and specifically implicates both the state auditor 
and the treasurer in the servicing of these warrants.139 
 While responsibility for the maintenance and upkeep of levees had originally been the 
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responsibility of the landowner, the gradual devolution of these responsibilities into the public 
domain not only follows the gradual planter counterrevolution into the 1870s after the 
reconstitution of a federally-aligned regime in 1864,140 but also tracks the issues facing the state 
at the time of the respective conventions. 
 Louisiana entered the Civil War with its new Constitution of 1861 in place, but this 
document largely reflected the status quo after secession, seeking to incorporate the work of the 
Constitution of 1852 with Louisiana’s newly independent, perpetually slaveholding, status. This 
document did little to alter the previous document beyond the cosmetic angle.141 The document 
contained no revisiting of issues of flood management or land management beyond what had 
been decided in 1852. That year’s basic law had specifically provided support for Congress’ 
efforts under the Swamp Lands Acts,142 codifying them in that law143 and reflecting the 
antebellum era’s existing plantation and slaveholding system. 
 The constitutions of 1864 and 1868 both reflected a lack of understanding of the scale of 
the problem confronting Louisiana’s radically changed flood control system. Martin Reuss in his 
authoritative Designing the Bayous, posits that policymakers simply did not grasp the scale of 
the problem they would soon face.144 General Banks’ dramatic invocation of levee and flood  
imagery during the debates of the convention that year  aside, the convention yielded no  
movement towards a constitutional approach to the looming crisis. The official proceedings of 
the convention mention nothing more about levees or flooding.  The 1868 Constitution makes 
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new mention of levees only in removing authority of two minor levee boards to enforce taxation 
in their respective jurisdictions.145 
 While the Constitution of 1868 did little to address the flooding in the state, it actually 
owes the timing of its proceedings and perhaps its very existence to the environmental challenges 
plaguing much of Postbellum Louisiana. On October 5, 1865, a group of delegates met in New 
Orleans’ iconic St. Charles Hotel on Canal Street. They had been selected and sent from fourteen 
parishes along the Mississippi River and several from the Atchafalaya Basin. They met with 
hopes of pressuring the state, then under the administration of Governor James Madison Wells, 
to finally confront the widespread failure of the state’s levee system.146 Agriculture would not 
totally cease in the Atchafalaya Basin until 1873, after that year’s destructive floods, and this 
meeting is an indication that these planters were active agents in their early efforts at securing 
political remedy. The meeting did succeed at attracting the attention of Governor Wells, who 
appointed a levee board to investigate the problem and it ultimately proved instrumental as the 
impetus for the special legislative session of November 29, 1865, the session which would call 
for a vote on convening a constitutional convention. This vote would later succeed, and the 
convention would produce the next Constitution.147 
This session’s ostensible goal was to confront these serious flood control issues. It did 
not, and an observer to the debates, unaware of their origins, would not have been able to deduce 
them. The session proved centrally motivated with the issue of a new constitution, and Wells 
himself, addressing the convened legislators at the session’s opening, made no mention of levees 
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at all. Issues ranged from labor to secret organizations operating in the state, but ultimately only 
the conclusions and recommendations of the governor’s pre-session levee board were 
approved.148 Wells did however manage to get himself considered as the new Senator 
fromLouisiana in Washington, a vote he narrowly lost.149 It is possible that Wells’ motivation 
behind the session was to have himself elevated to national office, and it is possible that the 
delegates who pressed for a new constitution, hardly a speedy proposal, were motivated by their 
own special interests from the outset. Taking advantage of a period of crisis for the expedition of 
political aims is not surprising, but its role in garnering support, as it did during a special session 
of the legislature, for revising the Constitution of 1864 helps to underscore the impact of 
flooding on the political institutions of Postbellum Louisiana. 
This episode also illuminates the changed role of planters in the political economy of the 
state during this chaotic period. While the representatives of agricultural interests were able to 
force the administration’s attention from the opulent cupola of the St. Charles Hotel, they were 
markedly powerless in the conduct of the session itself. It is striking that this “sugar bowl” parish 
elite, previously architects of the state’s 1852 basic law were now relegated to a marginal 
constituency in the conduct of legislative practice. 
 Louisiana under the Constitution of 1868 saw many experiments to legislate away the 
flooding woes that dogged Postbellum economic stability. The state’s experiments with the 
Levee Company, convict leasing, levee taxation and other politically innovative initiatives would 
help to create the atmosphere and political reality that finally raised the issue of levee 
construction and maintenance with the Constitution of 1879. 
The Constitution of 1879 provided specific provisions regarding taxation for levee works, 
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Figure  4. The Ames Crevasse, March 1891, is representative of the speed and scale of levee breaches. 150  
the empanelment of levee boards with local taxing power, and a seemingly final appeal to 
relinquishment of these efforts to the Federal government. Levee “purposes” appear under the 
short list of enumerated legitimate taxing purposes allowed to the state legislature.151 It tasked 
the state government with the mission of levee maintenance and construction explicitly, tied to 
constitutionally mandated taxation.152 This may be a reflection of the status quo, but also 
                                                 
150 George Francois Mugnier, “Crevasse in Levee,” Louisiana State Museum, George Francois Mugnier 
Collection. < http://www.louisianadigitallibrary.org/islandora/object/lsm-gfm%3A274> (Accessed April 2019). 
(The Ames Crevasse, named after Amesville, Louisiana, is today known as Marrero., located on New Orleans’ 
“West Bank.” 
              151 Constitution of the State of Louisiana, Adopted in Convention, at the City of New Orleans, the Twenty-
Third Day of July, A.D. 1879, Art. 204. 
              152 Ibid., Art. 213. 
45 
 
provides a constitutional check against arguments for landowner responsibility (culpability) in 
these matters, as surfaced in Louisiana Levee Company vs. the State of Louisiana. 
Conclusion: Towards an Environmental History of Reconstruction 
 
 This paper argues for the need to consider the history of Louisiana in the mid-19th century 
with a consciousness of the decisive role environmental forces and the state’s ecology have 
played in the course of some of its most important events. While the arguments presented here 
are largely focused on the widespread failures of the levees during the American Civil War and 
its aftermath and the progress of the state through Reconstruction, the role played by these 
natural forces in the state’s story are not limited to this temporality. That caveat aside, the role 
that the challenges of flood control faced by the state, particularly in the Atchafalaya Basin and 
along the lower course of the Mississippi River is underrepresented in the historiography for the 
powerful effect these natural systems had upon Reconstruction in the state. 
 Louisiana’s place in the history of the Reconstruction Era is well represented in works on  
the period. The beginnings of federal efforts to reincorporate the Confederacy into the Union 
originate with the Louisiana project begun in federally-occupied New Orleans in 1863. Events 
proceeding from the state including the ratification of the Louisiana Constitution of 1864, the 
violence surrounding the Constitutional Convention of 1868 (and subsequent effects upon the 
Johnson administration), the Battle of Liberty Place in 1874, and perceptions in the north of a 
state in chaos were all undeniably relevant to the progress of the period and cannot be ignored in 
the history of this era. However, the role played by the state’s environmental realities were not a 
minor element to the larger mosaic of actors and events153 and are best understood in the context 
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of these larger contemporary issues. The historiography of Reconstruction in Louisiana initially 
found little outside of New Orleans proper and the imposing plantation house to describe the 
events that transpired. Subsequent analyses have broadened our attention to the general store, the 
small farm, and the slave quarters. An attentive exploration of the role of the natural world in 
these events has the potential to fill in many of the gaps between these points and to unify the 
trials of Reconstruction across an ecological, geospatial canvass. 
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